University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 2016

Article 18

2016

Qualified Privilege from Defamation: Cracking the
Absolute Corporate Shell in DOJ Investigations
Joseph Egozi

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Recommended Citation
Egozi, Joseph (2016) "Qualified Privilege from Defamation: Cracking the Absolute Corporate Shell in DOJ Investigations," University
of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2016 , Article 18.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2016/iss1/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal Forum
by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Qualified Privilege from Defamation:
Cracking the Absolute Corporate Shell in
DOJ Investigations
Joseph Egozit

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine Robert Writt, a Shell employee working in Texas who is
responsible for approving payments to contractors for one of the world's
largest oil companies. Shell's outside counsel interviews him amid a
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation into a Shell outside
contractor who was recently convicted for violating the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA). Shell fires Writt and voluntarily reports to the
DOJ that he knowingly approved customs bribes for a Shell project in
Nigeria. Now, let's suppose Writt is innocent, but Shell incriminated
him so it could earn cooperation credit. Until recently, Writt could have
sued Shell for defamation because it published false statements about
him to the DOJ. However, under a highly anticipated decision by the
Texas Supreme Court, Shell Oil Co. v. Writt,1 individuals or entities
who make statements to law enforcement in serious contemplation of a
judicial proceeding now enjoy absolute-not just qualified-privilege for
their defamatory statements. 2 Not only has Writt lost his job, but he
could also be prosecuted individually for these alleged FCPA violations.
This could be the story of Shell. Instead of considering Writt's
claim on the merits, however, the court dismissed the action on
summary judgment because it found that Shell released its
investigative report upon serious threat of DOJ prosecution. 3 As a
result, the court avoided uncovering whether Writt was actually

t B.A. 2014, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago
Law School. To those who provided invaluable feedback throughout the writing process, I would
like to thank the past and present staff and board of The University of Chicago Legal Forum,
Professor Jennifer Nou, Ben Haley, and Andrew Boutros.

1 464 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2015).
Id. at 659-60.
3 Id. at 651.
2
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criminally responsible, focusing instead on the quasi-judicial nature of
Shell's interaction with the DOJ. 4 To uncover the true facts in cases
like Shell, the doors of the courthouse must be open to those who may
have been wronged and whose reputation may be impugned. Did a
disgruntled former employee bring a meritless suit or did a corporate
scapegoat sue for essential redress?
Traditionally, courts afford corporations absolute privilege from
defamation suits for statements made to law enforcement during
"quasi-judicial" proceedings, though there is no consensus on what
constitutes "quasi-judicial."5 Courts universally afford absolute
privilege to potentially defamatory statements made during judicial
proceedings; 6 absolute privilege is equivalent to immunity from an
action because it protects the corporation from liability regardless of
the statement's falsity or maliciousness. 7 However, state courts vary
markedly in determining what circumstances are sufficiently "quasijudicial" to warrant such absolute privilege. When an individual or
corporation communicates with law enforcement prior to a judicial
proceeding, most states afford only a qualified privilege that is lost
when abused, 8 such as when the speaker knows the statement to be
false or motivated by malice. 9 Other states apply absolute privilege
from defamation in these circumstances, 1 0 such as when Shell made
statements to the DOJ prior to its execution of a deferred prosecution
agreement (DPA). 11

Id. at 655.
Piper M. Wilihite, Defamation Law: Privileges from Liability: Distinguishing QuasiJudicial Proceedings from Proceedings Which Are Preliminary to Judicial Hearings, 47 OKLA. L.
REV. 541, 542 (1994).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 (1977) ("A witness is absolutely privileged to
publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed
judicial proceeding or as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has some
relation to the proceeding.").
See W. Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 16 at 109 (5th ed. 1984); see,
e.g., Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) ("[D]efamatory statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, and no cause of action for damages will lie,
regardless of how false or malicious the statements may be, so long as the statements are relevant
to the subject of inquiry.").
8
See, e.g., Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that communications made during the course of a law enforcement investigation are
qualified privileged).
9 Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. 1987).
10 See, e.g., McGranahan v. Dahar, 408 A.2d 121, 128 (N.H. 1979) (adopting the "rule that
treats both formal and informal complaints and statements to a prosecuting authority as part of
the initial steps in a judicial proceeding [and] entitled to absolute immunity . . . ").
" Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 652-53 (Tex. 2015). A DPA is essentially "a form of
probation which enables a corporation to avoid pleading guilty to a crime or even being indicted.
Under such an agreement, the company commits to performing certain agreed-upon measures and
refraining from criminal conduct for the duration of the agreement's term, at the end of which if
the company has complied with all the terms, the government drops all charges." Andrew
4
5
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The DOJ corporate prosecution landscape leads to significant
pressure on corporations to cooperate through substantial fines for
corporate misconduct and the looming fear of suspension, debarment,
and other collateral consequences.1 2 Prosecutors leverage these fears by
demanding, now as a matter of formal DOJ policy, that companies
name individual employees responsible for misconduct in order to
qualify for cooperation credit.13 This creates a "catch-22 of corporate
cooperation," which arises when the cooperation necessary to minimize
criminal fines also bars a corporation from invoking absolute privilege
as a defense to future claims of defamation. 14 One potential solution to
this catch-22 is declaring the DOJ a quasi-judicial body as a matter of
law. 15 This would guarantee absolute privilege for all potentially
defamatory statements made to the DOJ before a judicial proceeding,
regardless of who initiated the investigation or the statement's
accuracy.
However, in policing corporations and prioritizing cooperation, the
DOJ's enforcement strategies disregard potentially harmful effects on
individual employees' legal remedies. Absolute privilege leaves an
individual plaintiff unemployed and likely blackballed from similar jobs
without sufficient means to restore her reputation. This Comment
proposes the opposite solution, which the Texas Court of Appeals
endorsed in Shell. 16 Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, all
Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 413,
(2007).
12
See, e.g., Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice,
on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, to All U.S. Att'ys et al. 5 (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download
[https://perma.cc/8KGY-R8XJ]
[hereinafter
"Yates Memo"]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013, Second Largest Annual Recovery in History,
Whistleblower Lawsuits Soar to 752 (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/
2013/December/13-civ-1352.html [https://perma.cc/R4VY-4WVC]; Jimmy Hoover, Feds Say SkyHigh Fines Show Perks of FCPA Self-Reporting, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.1aw360.com/
articles/63 1116/feds-say-sky-high-fines-show-perks-of-fcpa-self reporting [https://perma.cc/3VR2GQ2C] ("Had the company ... cooperated with investigations, prosecutors would have sought as
little as $207 million, or 73 percent less."); F. Joseph Warin et al., 2013 Year-End Update on
Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution Agreements-Part 2, 28
WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 2, at *2 (2014) ("For companies that receive a substantial

portion of their business from the federal government, debarment or suspension from federal
contracting is among the most potentially damaging of the collateral consequences of indictment or
conviction.").

a Gary G. Grindler & Laura K. Bennett, True Cooperation: DOJ's "Reshaped Conversation"
and Its Consequences, 30-SUM CRIM. JUST. 32, 34-35 (2015).
1 Alyssa Ladd, Comment, The Catch-22 of Corporate Cooperation in Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct Investigations, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 947, 948 (2014).
"s Id. at 975-77.
6 See Writt v. Shell Oil Co., 409 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 464 S.W.3d 650
(Tex. 2015) ("To extend the absolute privilege to the circumstances of the instant case, where
neither Shell nor Writt was a party to an ongoing or proposed judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding
at the time that Shell made the complained-of statements, would have the very dangerous effect of
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statements made before a formal judicial proceeding should enjoy only
qualified privilege from defamation actions. This would keep the
courthouse doors ajar, allowing inculpated employees to sue and
recover damages from corporations that made malicious or deliberately
false statements to law enforcement.
Mere months after the Shell decision, Deputy Attorney General
Sally Yates issued a memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys requiring that
corporations name culpable individuals to qualify for cooperation
credit.17 This Comment recommends that the DOJ targets a new
problem in Shell resulting from these changing priorities in corporate
prosecution-courts must balance DOJ incentives to name individuals
with an individual's interest in having her defamation action heard.18
Since DOJ practices will continue to pressure corporations to cooperate
and identify culpable employees, the DOJ should issue guidance
documents on conducting responsible corporate investigations free of
scapegoating. Similarly, the courts should implement a qualified
privilege rule consistent with both the quasi-judicial doctrine and the
needs of individual employees. Ultimately, this Comment proposes
modifications to the corporate prosecution landscape that balance
administrability, fairness for both corporations and individuals, and the
DOJ's primary goal of uncovering the full scope of corporate
misconduct.
Part II will highlight the varying circumstances that state courts
consider sufficiently quasi-judicial to warrant absolute privilege. Part
III will demonstrate that the DOJ's increasing emphasis on implicating
criminally responsible individuals and its leverage in settlement
negotiations lead corporations to ignore collateral defamation actions.
Employing Shell as a case study, Part IV will assess the "quasi-judicial"
framework and establish that the DOJ lacks the qualities and
safeguards necessary to warrant absolute privilege. Finally, Part V will
propose a uniform rule of qualified privilege from defamation. A
qualified privilege rule would help corporations navigate compliance;
eliminate a perverse timing paradox that rewards delayed cooperation;

actually discouraging parties from being truthful with law-enforcement agencies and instead
encourage them to deflect blame to others without fear of consequence.").
17 Yates Memo, supra note 12, at 3-4; see discussion infra Part IIA; Amelia Toy Rudolph, The
Yates Memo and the Ethical and Strategic Challenges It Presents for White Collar Defense
Attorneys, in MANAGING WHITE COLLAR LEGAL ISSUES: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING
CLIENT EXPECTATIONS, CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF

RECENT CASES 74 (Aspatore ed., 2016) ("[The Yates Memo appears to depart from recent DOJ
policy, with the potential to pit corporate employer and individual employees against one another
in ways that may undermine the goals the DOJ was attempting to achieve and that certainly will
raise the degree of difficulty for white collar defense attorneys attempting to represent both
corporate and individual interests in an investigation.").
1s See Shell, 464 S.W.3d
at 655.
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and, most importantly, protect victims of malicious defamation that
lack legal recourse under the Shell absolute privilege rule.
II. SURVEYING DEFAMATORY PRIVILEGE ACROSS STATES
During a preliminary DOJ investigation, a corporation can be
liable to an employee for defamation when it communicates false
incriminating information to the DOJ. Defamation, which includes libel
and slander suits, is a written or oral communication that tends to
"harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of
the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him." 19 The three affirmative defenses to defamation are truth, 20
privilege, 21 and consent. 22 When a corporation faces both a defamation
action initiated by an employee and a DOJ investigation, however, the
only realistic defense is privilege. 23 Therefore, a corporation's defense to
an employee's defamation action is limited to one of two classes of
privilege: absolute and qualified. 24 Both are based on public policy
considerations, which balance "the good to be accomplished by the free
and open exchange of information over the harm which may result from
a falsehood." 25
Absolute privilege is reserved for statements made during the
course of a "judicial proceeding" or in contemplation of a judicial
proceeding and cannot be defeated by proof of malicious intent. 26 It also
extends to legislative and quasi-judicial proceedings,2 7 such as
administrative 28 and other like proceedings "of a judicial nature before
a competent court or before a tribunal or officer clothed with judicial'or
quasi-judicial powers." 29

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).

Id. at § 581A ("One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject
to liability
for defamation if the statement is true.").
21
See id. at Five 25 2 B Intro. Note (commenting that the law justifies certain
"privileges"
because of the policy that "the ends to be gained by permitting defamatory statements" outweigh
"the harm that may be done to the reputation of others").
22
Id. at § 583.
2
Ladd, supra note 14, at 970-71. If a corporation pursued the truth defense, it would have to
admit that its own employee was criminally responsible, thereby jeopardizing its pursuit of a
favorable settlement. It is also doubtful that a corporation would have the individual's consent to
defame. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. c (requiring affirmative consent and
stating that a mere indifference to defamatory publications does not constitute consent).
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 583-612.
' Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. 1987).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 587-88.
27 Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d
at 768.
28 Bergman v. Hupy, 221 N.W.2d 898,
900 (Wis. 1974).
29
53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 104(b),
p. 169.
20
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Qualified privilege, meanwhile, is reserved for instances where "(a)
there is information that affects a sufficiently important public interest,
and (b) the public interest requires the communication of the
defamatory matter to a public officer or a private citizen who is
authorized or privileged to take action if the defamatory matter is
true." 30 Qualified privilege can be defeated with a showing of actual
malice, 31 or if the defamer failed to act in the public interest and knew
the statements to be untrue. 32
When assessing defamation actions, states vary widely in the
circumstances they deem sufficiently quasi-judicial to warrant absolute
versus qualified privilege. A minority of states afford absolute privilege
to communication with law enforcement during a preliminary
investigation, as in pre-indictment. 33 This includes cases where the
corporation or individual volunteered the allegedly defamatory
statement to law enforcement, 34 and those in which law enforcement
solicited the communication. 35 This broader view of "quasi-judicial" is
designed to "encourage the utmost freedom of communication between
citizens and public authorities." 3 6 However, affording corporations
absolute privilege irrespective of the disclosure's timing or
circumstances essentially prioritizes freedom of any communication,
privileging even false and malicious statements.
Conversely, most states protect communication to law enforcement
during a preliminary investigation with only qualified privilege. 37 This
'0

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598.

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defining a statement
made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.").
32
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 599-603; see also Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d at 768.
* See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sargent, 916 F.2d 1119, 1125-27 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Kentucky
law); Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1956); Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282, 1285 (Nev.
2014); Hagberg v. California Fed. Bank FSB, 81 P.3d 244, 251 (Cal. 2004); Correllas v. Viveiros,
572 N.E.2d 7, 11 (Mass. 1991); Starnes v. Int'l Harvester Co., 539 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989), rev'd on other grounds; Bryson v. News Am. Publications, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207 (Ill. 1996);
Cutts v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 505 So. 2d 1211, 1215 (Ala. 1987); McGranahan v. Dahar, 408
A.2d 121, 128 (N.H. 1979); Shinglemeyer v. Wright, 82 N.W. 887, 890 (Mich. 1900).
See, e.g., O'Shea v. Gen. Tel. Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 715, 720 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("Even
unsolicited communications from citizens to governmental agencies have been held protected by
the absolute privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2.").
35 See, e.g., Cutts, 505 So. 2d at 1215 (holding that insurance company is absolutely privileged
from defamation over letter to district attorney).
6 O'Shea, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 720; see also Correllas, 572 N.E.2d at 11 (favoring absolute
privilege because "any final judgment may depend largely on the testimony of the party or
witness, and full disclosure ... should not be hampered by fear of an action for defamation.").
37 See Lyons v. Midwest Glazing, L.L.C., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1046 (N.D. Iowa 2002);
Kahermanes v. Marchese, 361 F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Marsh v. Commercial & Say.
Bank, 265 F. Supp. 614, 621 (W.D. Va. 1967); Gallo v. Barile, 935 A.2d 103, 111 (Conn. 2007);
DeLong v. Yu Enter., Inc., 47 P.3d 8, 12 (Or. 2002); Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 625 A.2d 959, 969 (Md.
1993); Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992); Kissell v. Dunn, 793 F. Supp. 389, 393
31
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approach also includes cases where communication was completely
voluntary, 38 and those where law enforcement
solicited the
communication. 3 9 The Florida Supreme Court defended qualified
privilege in such cases because absolute privilege unnecessarily
protects those who make "intentionally false and malicious defamatory
statements to the police." 40 Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court
discussed that "a citizen making an informal statement to police should
not enjoy blanket immunity from an action; instead, such statements
should receive protection only if they were made in good faith, to
discourage an abuse of the privilege."4 1 Wisconsin even distinguishes
privilege by recipient, reserving absolute privilege for statements to
prosecutors, and qualified privilege for statements to police officers. 42 A
qualified privilege rule properly exempts false or malicious
communication, but is subject to criticism for potential chilling effects
on communication and cooperation with law enforcement. As discussed
below, the incentives for corporate cooperation are high enough where
potential chilling effects are practically nonexistent. 43

III. WHAT MAKES DOJ CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNIQUE?
NAMING NAMES
Privilege from defamation is a growing problem for corporations
under DOJ investigation because of the DOJ's increasing emphasis on
naming names to receive cooperation credit, as well as a substantial
negotiation power imbalance that leaves corporations with practically
zero leverage.
A.

The Paradox of Naming Names

The DOJ's increasing pressure on corporations to name names
results in a balancing act between earning cooperation credit and
avoiding subsequent employee defamation actions. The trend towards
naming individual employees grew in 2008 when the DOJ updated its
"Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations" to reward

(D.R.I. 1992); Toker v. Pollak, 376 N.E.2d 163, 167 (N.Y. 1978); Bienvenu v. Angelle, 223 So. 2d
140, 144 (La. 1969); Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985);
Dijkstra v. Westerink, 401 A.2d 1118, 1120 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Hardaway v.
Sherman Enter., Inc., 210 S.E.2d 363, 364 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Davenport v. Armstead, 255
S.W.2d 132, 134-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
3 See Gallo, 935 A.2d at 111.
" See Indiana Nat' Bank, 482 N.E.2d at 479.
40 Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69.
" DeLong, 47 P.3d at 12.
42
See Bergman v. Hupy, 221 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Wis. 1974).
4
See discussion infra Part V.A.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

718

[ 2016

"timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and [a] willingness to
cooperate in the investigation of [the corporation's] agents." 4 4 Recent
speeches by senior DOJ officials suggest that "true cooperation"securing evidence of individual culpability-is the single most
important factor in the DOJ's decision on whether to bring criminal
charges or offer a better deal.4 5 DOJ Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Marshall L. Miller stressed the importance of
demonstrating "extensive efforts to secure evidence of individual
46
culpability" to prosecutors when seeking full cooperation credit.
Similarly, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell remarked in a
recent speech that disclosing the corporation's misconduct is
insufficient. "True cooperation," she explained, "requires identifying the
individuals actually responsible for the misconduct-be they executives
or others-and the provision of all available facts relating to that
misconduct."4 7 Finally, in the Yates Memo, the DOJ made clear that it
no longer simply suggests corporations name culpable individuals; it
requires names if a company wants to be eligible for cooperation
credit. 4 8
The DOJ focuses on individual wrongdoing to identify the full
scope of corporate misconduct. 4 9 Because "a corporation only acts
through individuals," the DOJ considers investigating individual
conduct "the most efficient and effective way to determine the facts and
the extent of any corporate misconduct."5 0 Uncovering culpable
individuals is also likely to lead to others with knowledge of the
misconduct, thereby providing the full picture of criminality at any
level of the organization.5 1 Maximizing the likelihood that the final

44
U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.300(A)(4) Factors to Be Considered (2008); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2010) (establishing cooperation as a mitigating
factor).
41 Grindler & Bennett, supranote 13, at 34-35.
6 Marshall L. Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Remarks at
the Global Investigation Review Program (Sept. 17, 2014) (transcript available at
http: //www.justice.gov/opaspeech/remarks-principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-criminaldivision-marshall-l-miller [https://perma.cc/Q9K3-PVBY]).
17 Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div., Remarks at New York
University Law School's Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://I1.usa.gov/1UIUMtGx [https://perma.cc/'9CQ-ERB7] (emphasis added). For a large company
like Shell with global operations, note that identifying all available facts is a massive undertaking.
See Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex. 2015).
41 See Yates Memo, supra note 12, at 3.

49

U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL

(2015).
50

Id.

1

Id.

§ 9-28.010

Foundational Principles of Corporate Prosecution
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resolution includes individual charges and not just corporate charges
also serves to promote public confidence in the justice system. 52
With the DOJ's emphasis on individual culpability, corporations
face a balancing act between massive and potentially crippling fines,53
and cooperation with the DOJ that exposes the corporation to
defamation actions brought by inculpated employees.5 4 The more a
company proactively cooperates, the more likely it is that a court will
find statements made before a judicial proceeding protected by
qualified, as opposed to absolute, privilege. This dilemma was apparent
as Shell seriously contemplated facing prosecution under the FCPA
before furnishing its allegedly defamatory report to the DOJ.66 The
court reasoned that when Shell provided its report, it was under DOJ
investigation and "acted with serious contemplation of the possibility
that it might be prosecuted." 56 Thus, the court followed the Second
Restatement of Torts § 588 to afford Shell absolute privilege "when the
communication has some relation to a proceeding that is actually
contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration by the
witness or a possible party to the proceeding." 57
The DOJ could argue that corporate prosecution is no different
from the prosecution of organized crime, gangs, and other criminal
organizations, in that naming other members is a prerequisite to
cooperation credit. However, corporate prosecution is unique-if a
corporation names an employee responsible for criminal conduct,
respondeat superior exposes the corporation to immediate legal risk.
Questions inevitably arise about the extent to which supervisors at the
corporation approved the misconduct. By contrast, if a gang-member is
prosecuted, a court will not necessarily tie that individual's conduct to
the criminal organization without evidence of a conspiracy or RICO
violations.5 8
B.

DOJ Corporate Coercion's Incentives to Defame

Corporations are also likely to feel coerced into naming culpable
individuals because of a substantial negotiation power imbalance

52

id.

See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 12; Hoover, supra note 12.
Ladd, supra note 14, at 948.
5
See Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex. 2015).
16 Id. at 660.
5' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 cmt. E (1977).
58 Mafiosos and gang-members tend not to incorporate, exposing themselves to more
collective prosecution than RICO would allow. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
5
'
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between the DOJ and corporations under investigation.5 9 Professor
Richard Epstein likened pre-trial corporate negotiations with the DOJ
to "the confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as battered corporations
recant their past sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of
any underlying offense." 60 Hyperbolic? Yes, but this sentiment results
from corporations' need to devote vast resources to compliance seeking
a favorable deferred or non-prosecution agreement. 6 1 Otherwise, the
consequences of a corporate indictment could be lethal. 62
Comparing Shell's exposure in Writt's defamation action to the
probable fine decrease in its DPA, defaming an employee might have
been the financially advisable strategy. Shell's self-investigation cost
over $10 million, spanned eighteen months, involved both inside and
outside counsel in addition to forensic consultants, and recommended
disciplinary actions for staff members, including terminating Writt's
employment. 63 Ultimately, the DOJ filed an information charging Shell
with FCPA violations, executed a DPA, and fined Shell $30 million
along with other sanctions. 64 Adding the costs of defending a
defamation action in an absolute privilege jurisdiction until summary
judgment, Shell's potentially defamatory strategy likely cost the
company no more than $50 million. 65 By comparison, had Shell refused
to cooperate and subjected itself to a later defamation action, Shell
5 See Matt Senko, ProsecutorialOverreaching in Deferred ProsecutionAgreements, 19 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 163-64 (2009) ("[Because of the draconian consequences of indictment, which
often include the downfall of an entire business, corporate entities have little practical choice when
faced with either indictment or accepting a DPA. Hence, the government has enormous leverage in
negotiating terms of DPAs, which has resulted in prosecutorial overreaching and deals which are
unfair for corporate entities."); see also Peter Reilly, Negotiating Bribery: Toward Increased
Transparency, Consistency, and Fairness in Pretrial Bargaining Under the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 347, 377-83 (2014).
6
Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., The Deferred ProsecutionRacket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2006),
[https://perma.cc/P9KD-XUCE]; see also
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116468395737834160
Weissman with Newman, supra note 11, at 426-27 & n.51 ("[A] corporation has little choice but to
accede to the government's demands. Indeed, it is now a commonplace position among the whitecollar community post-Enron-amongst both defense and prosecution-that corporate defense
consists largely of being an arm of the prosecutor.").
" See Pamela H. Bucy, Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1287, 1288-89 (2007).
62
See, e.g., Jonathan N. Rosen, In-House Counsel and the Government's War on Corporate
Fraud, CRIM. JUST at 5, 6 (Fall 2010) ("An indictment will effectively end an organization's ability
to seek government contracts; it will inevitably harm the company's reputation among its
customers; and invariably, it will curtail the company's ability to do business until the matter is
resolved."); Weissman with Newman, supra note 11, at 425-27 (discussing public perception of
corporate indictments following the failure of Arthur Anderson LLP post-Enron and its refusal to
accept a DPA).
6
Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex. 2015).
Id. at 652.
65 This estimate assumes, for the purposes of analyzing future incentives, that the case would
not proceed to the Texas Supreme Court and hike lawyers' fees once there is clear precedent on the
issue.
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could have faced a fine comparable to that of past FCPA corporate
prosecutions exceeding one hundred million dollars.6 6
This calculus demonstrates that a corporation will typically
cooperate with the DOJ whether or not it defames its employees. With
this in mind, a privilege rule should incentivize corporations to
cooperate truthfully. In a qualified privilege regime, Shell's actions
would expose them to an additional $1.5 million in alleged damages for
Writt's lost income, an unspecified amount for damages to reputation,
and punitive damages. 67 While compensatory damages in this case
might not seem to alter Shell's cost-benefit analysis, if a case proceeds
to trial and actual malice is uncovered, a court or jury may at least levy
sufficient punitive damages to deter corporations from adversely
responding to DOJ pressure by defaming employees in the future.
Although scholars such as Epstein are troubled by the DOJ's
coercion of corporations into settlement agreements, this practice of
highly incentivizing cooperations allows the DOJ to effectively enforce
laws far beyond their resource capacity. The DOJ effectively deputizes
company counsel as "[a]gents of the [flederal [g]overnment": the
company conducts the investigation, elicits Fifth Amendment waivers
from its employees, waives attorney-client and work-product privilege,
terminates culpable employees, and reports back to the DOJ with their
findings seeking a favorable settlement.68 White collar defense attorney
N. Richard Janis finds this dynamic not only troubling, but one that
stems from prosecutorial laziness. 69 While there are certainly issues
with the lack of judicial oversight in the deferred prosecution
landscape, 70 the DOJ's tactics-far less lazy than resourceful-are
better viewed as a response to the post-Enron-scandal reality that the
federal government cannot root out white-collar crime on its own.
66
See, e.g., Gibson Dunn, 2014 Year-End FCPA Update 3 (2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/documents/2014-Year-End-FCPA-Update.pdf
[https: //perma.cclN9PA-Q6Y8]
(calculating a $156,610,000 average total value of monetary resolutions in 2014 corporate FCPA
enforcement actions between the DOJ and SEC); Hoover, supra note 12, ("Had the company ...
cooperated with investigations, prosecutors would have sought as little as $207 million, or 73
percent less.").
7
Robert Writt v. Shell Oil Co., No. 2009-65221, 2010 WL 6556736 (Tex. Dist.
Dec. 3, 2010).
6

N. Richard Janis, Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the Federal Government,

CATO INST. 11-12 (2008), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/janis-deputizing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJ8E-V2PM]; see Rosen, supra note 62, at 6 (outlining the hazards of company
counsel "increasingly deputized in law-enforcement activity").
69

Janis, supra note 68, at 11.

' See Rosen, supra note 62, at 7 ("[B]ecause a DPA is not usually enforced under court
supervision, the prosecutor has virtually absolute discretion to decree whether a company did
cooperate and, if the prosecutor thinks it did not, to prosecute the company at the end of the
investigation anyway."); see generally Reilly, supra note 59 (noting the disturbing lack of FCPA
jurisprudence and guidance for corporations to effectively navigate the FPCA and prevent criminal
conduct).
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Corporations must believe that reporting misconduct is more prudent
than burying it or misrepresenting self-disclosure to the DOJ.
to adopt more responsible
corporations
By incentivizing
investigatory techniques and cooperate earlier in the process, the DOJ
can improve enforcement and protect vulnerable employees. Thus,
rather than taking steps that might inhibit the DOJ's ability to police
corporations, the DOJ should welcome a default qualified privilege rule
on responsible internal
guidance documents
and promulgate
investigations to incentivize more truthful cooperation.
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS NOT
A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY

No case law or scholarship up to this point has given full attention
to the argument that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. One student
comment from 2014 argues the alternative: 7 1 that designating the DOJ
a quasi-judicial body and affording absolute privilege to corporate
statements made to the DOJ during a preliminary investigation would
solve the "catch-22 of corporate cooperation." 72 However, the DOJ is not
quasi-judicial when considering the six quasi-judicial factors below. The
DOJ also lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent abuse of
defamatory privilege. Thus, any statements to DOJ prosecutors during
a preliminary investigation should only enjoy qualified privilege from
defamation actions.
Features of a Quasi-Judicial Body

A.

Jurisdictions vary widely in their standard for quasi-judicial
74
bodies. 73 In Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., the New
Jersey Supreme Court found a proceeding before the Director of the
Milk Industry quasi-judicial because the director had the power to "fix
prices . . ., promulgate rules and regulations, and investigate alleged

Ladd, supra note 14, at 975-77.
Id. at 948 ("The Catch-22 of corporate cooperation arises when the cooperation that reduces
criminal fines also prevents the corporation from invoking the affirmative defense of privilege
against future claims of defamation.").
Cf. Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1956) (construing Idaho law to apply absolute
7
immunity to "information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of initiating a
prosecution"), and McGranahan v. Dahar, 408 A.2d 121, 128 (N.H. 1979), with Bienvenu v.
Angelle, 223 So. 2d 140, 144 (La. 1969) (holding that defamatory statements published in the
course of investigative work are not quasi-judicial in nature and are therefore afforded only a
qualified privilege), and Marsh v. Commercial & Say. Bank, 265 F. Supp. 614, 621 (W.D. Va. 1967)
(holding that witnesses' statements to police officers preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding
were qualified privileged).
7
117 A.2d 889, 894 (N.J. 1955).
7'

71

QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE FROM DEFAMATION

711]

723

violations thereof" through formal and informal hearings.7 5 Several
jurisdictions adopt a more coherent quasi-judicial test that considers
the following factors:
(1) the power to exercise judgment and discretion;
(2) the power to hear and determine or to ascertain facts and
decide;
(3) the power to make binding orders and judgments;
(4) the power to affect the personal or property rights of private
persons;
(5) the power to examine witnesses, to compel the attendance of
witnesses, and to hear the litigation of issues on a hearing; and
(6) the power to enforce decisions or impose penalties.7 6
A governmental body need not satisfy all six factors to be
considered quasi-judicial.7 7 Subject to minor differences in the quasijudicial nature of DPAs and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs),7 8 the
DOJ fails to satisfy any of the six factors identified above.
1. The DOJ's discretion is administrative, not quasi-judicial.
Proponents of the DOJ's quasi-judicial status argue that the DOJ
exercises discretion in deciding whether to file charges.79 However, to
determine whether this discretion is quasi-judicial, one must analyze
the type of discretion involved. All governmental bodies, many of them
hardly quasi-judicial, exercise discretion in one form or another, but
judicial discretion is distinct. Professor Sir William Wade explained
this distinction between "judicial discretions," which "conform to a
norm, however indefinable, and which are accordingly liable to review
7

Id. at 892.

See, e.g., Shanks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 169 F.3d 988, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that
the National Transportation Safety Board is quasi-judicial); Kocontes v. McQuaid, 778 N.W.2d
410, 420 (Neb. 2010) (holding that the Nebraska Board of Pardons is quasi-judicial); Craig v.
Stafford Const., Inc., 856 A.2d 372, 381 (Conn. 2004) (holding that the internal affairs division of
the Hartford police department is quasi-judicial).
7
See Shanks, 169 F.3d at 994.
7' See Allen R. Brooks, A CorporateCatch-22: How Deferred and Non- ProsecutionAgreements
Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 137, 14954 (2010) (summarizing the modern use and functionality of DPAs and NPAs: "The prosecutor will
file formal charges with a court before entering into a DPA with a defendant. With NPAs,
defendants may escape formal charges, subject to the corporation's adequate performance under
the terms of its NPA.").
7 See Ladd, supra note 14, at 976.
76
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on appeal," and "administrative powers," where the discretion is one of
policy, incapable of being invalidated as a matter of law by a higher
authority. 0
When the DOJ reaches a DPA with a corporation as it did in Shell,
it does not exercise judicial discretion supporting quasi-judicial status.
Instead, the DOJ exercises an administrative power. Rather than
prosecuting the case and leaving the liability question to judicial
discretion, the DOJ concludes that the value of cooperation, the
corporation's future financial viability, and institutional compliance
brought about by a DPA outweigh the corporation's violation of the
law.81 In deciding whether to file charges, the DOJ exercises this
administrative discretion by weighing various public interest factors
outlined in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, "Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations." 82 Conversely, in interpreting
the law once the DOJ files charges, the court exercises a judicial
discretion reviewable on appeal.
Although DPAs are subject to court approval, such exercises of the
DOJ's administrative discretion are rarely challenged. The court must
approve all DPAs to comply with the Speedy Trial Act.8 3 The court
could theoretically scrutinize these agreements to ensure a factual
basis for the crime or rule out valid defenses relevant to the alleged
conduct. 84 Yet, nearly every DPA negotiated with a U.S. corporation
has been rubber stamped by the court without judicial modification.8 5
The few judges that have conducted hearings before approving a
corporate DPA have struggled to assert a consistent or effective
oversight role.8 6 Practitioners question whether it is even the court's

role under the Speedy Trial Act's approval provision to determine
0 H.W.R. Wade, "Quasi-Judicial"and Its Background, 10 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 216, 224 (1949).
The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations authorize DOJ
prosecutors, "under appropriate circumstances," to use NPAs and DPAs to "help restore the
integrity of a company's operations and preserve the financial viability of a corporation that has
engaged in criminal conduct" while still "preserving the government's ability to prosecute a
recalcitrant corporation that materially breaches the agreement." U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 928.100(B) Collateral Consequences (2008).
82 Id. at § 9-28.000 ('In exercising [prosecutorial] discretion, prosecutors should consider the
following statements of principles that summarize the considerations they should weigh and the
practices they should follow in discharging their prosecutorial responsibilities.").
" See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2000).
Mike Koehler, The Fagade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 936 (2010).
m Reilly, supra note 59, at 393; see also Koehler, supra note 84, at 936; Candace Zierdt
Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing,
96 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2007-2008) ("Deferred and non-prosecution agreements often occur without
judicial oversight or participation.... Even in the rare case that has court participation, it is
usually a mere formality of the document being filed in the court.").
8f See Douglas Gillison, HSBC Judge, Reluctant to Bless Settlement, Explores Court's Role,
GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Mar. 29, 2013), http: //globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/
1021997/hsbc-judge-reluctant-bless- settlement-explores-courts-role [https://perma.cclNU3U-46L2].
&
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whether a DPA is in the public interest.8 7 Thus, in practice, this policy
discretion is vested in the DOJ; unlike judicial discretion, it does not
conform to any sort of legally reviewable norm. NPAs are an even
stronger example of the DOJ's administrative power because they are
not filed with the court and are therefore shielded from judicial
approval or scrutiny.88
Beyond negotiation of DPAs and NPAs, the DOJ's decision whether
to file charges is also an exercise of administrative power. When the
DOJ declines to file charges altogether, courts consistently reject
Administrative Procedure Act challenges to these decisions as judicially
unreviewable.89 In DOJ-prosecuted cases, proponents of the DOd's
quasi-judicial status can argue that the decision to file charges is quasijudicial because it is effectively reviewed on appeal when the court or
jury hears the case. However, the court or jury's role in such cases is to
determine guilt, not to review the DOJ's decision to seek an indictment.
Thus, even the DOd's decision whether to file charges is administrative
under Professor Wade's framework.
2. The DOJ lacks power to hear facts and issues in litigation.
The power to "hear" facts and issues in litigation, considered in the
second and fifth factors, 90 suggests some sort of adversarial proceeding
beyond the DOd's mere prosecutorial decisions to interview witnesses,
collect evidence, and bring charges. This power to hear facts and issues
invokes an important safeguard of quasi-judicial proceedings that
justifies affording greater privilege: due process. 9 1 While the level of
due process required is less for quasi-judicial hearings, 92 in general, due
process requires that parties have an opportunity to be heard, with
notice of the hearing, before an impartial body; parties should also be
able to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and be informed of
all the facts upon which the body acts. 9 3 When Shell released its report
to the DOJ, Writt had no venue or hearing to challenge the potentially
defamatory statements. He could not cross-examine witnesses'
statements in the report. Nor could he challenge the hearsay upon
hearsay built into the proffer to the DOJ that likely preceded Shell's

Id.
Koehler, supra note 84, at 935.
* Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing CorporateCompliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 977 (2009).
" Shanks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 169 F.3d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 1999).
' Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
92 Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Hadley v.
Dep't of Admin., 411 So. 2d 184
(Fla. 1982)).
* Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-83 (1975).
8
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DPA. 94 Moreover, unlike settlement negotiations that resulted in
Shell's DPA, 95 during a plea bargain hearing the court asks whether
the corporation understands the rights being waived and ensures that
there is a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing approval of the
agreement. 96
Discussing the elements of a fair hearing, Judge Friendly
recognized that "the further the tribunal is removed from the agency
and thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the need for other
procedural safeguards. 97 The DOJ, however, cannot possibly conduct a
hearing as a tribunal when acting through its prosecutorial function.
Were the DOJ acting through one of its internal quasi-judicial
agencies, 98 it would be equally limited under the Administrative
Procedure Act from simultaneously fulfilling a prosecutorial and
judicial role. 99

3. The DOJ has only limited power to make binding judgments.
The DOJ can only bind judgments in the context of an NPA. 100 If
the DOJ negotiates a DPA with a corporation, the DOJ can have no
binding effect on the courts, which ultimately approve or reject the final
agreement. 10 1 As discussed above, 102 the DOJ exercises all of the policy
discretion in crafting DPAs, but lacks the judicial power to bind parties
to the agreements because they require court approval. 103 The DOJ
divisions responsible for bringing corporate criminal charges, including
94
See Kenneth C. Pickering, The Risks and Benefits of Proffer Agreements in Parallel
Proceedings, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Apr. 4, 2012), http: //apps.americanbar.org /litigation/
committees/criminallemaillwinter2012/winter2012 -0402-risks-benefits-proffer-agreements-parallel
-proceedings.html [https://perma.cc/52FK-HKKC] ("A proffer is almost always required for
government investigators to evaluate whether to recommend entering into a cooperation
agreement, or a deferred or non-prosecution agreement."); United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57,
67 & n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1979), superseded by statute, FED.R.EVID. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United
States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025 (11th Cir. 2001) ("In effect, this proffered statement presents a
double hearsay problem under Rule 806, since the actual proffer is hearsay under Rule 804(b)(5)
containing more traditional hearsay within it.").
" See Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2015).
1
Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 85, at 14-15.
9
Friendly, supra note 93, at 1279.
98
See infra Part IV.A.3.
9
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
100
See Ralph F. Hall, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, in PUNISHING
CORPORATE CRIME: LEGAL PENALTIES FOR CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY VIOLATIONS 119, 124
(James T. O'Reilly et al. eds., 2009) (describing an NPA as a formal agreement between the
government and the corporation releasing the corporation from liability).
10'
Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 922 (2007)
("[C]ourts must review deferred prosecution agreements and approve any deferral."); see, e.g.,
United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012).
1o2
See discussion, supra Part IV.A.1

'03

See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(2).
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the U.S. Attorneys' offices, 104 are merely prosecutorial agencies
dependent on the judiciary to produce binding judgments. By contrast,
each of the agencies within the DOJ considered by courts to fulfill
quasi-judicial functions are all formal tribunals with far less restraint
from courts, save appellate review, such as the Executive Office of
Immigration Review,105 the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals, 0 6 the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 0 and the Appeals Council of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 0 8 among others.
The Shell court claimed to follow Clemens v. McNamee' 09 when
finding the DOJ's preliminary investigation sufficiently quasi-judicial
to warrant absolute privilege;11 0 however, the court in Clemens noted
that, in order to receive absolute privilege, statements must be made to
"an agency whose findings need not be approved or ratified by another
agency.""' The court had to approve the DOJ's findings in Shell,
disclosed in a DPA.11 2 Nonetheless, the court erroneously granted
absolute privilege to Shell's statements.
4. The DOJ fails the remaining three quasi-judicial factors.
The fourth factor, "power to affect the personal or property rights
of private persons,"113 also depends on whether the DOJ executes a
DPA or NPA with the corporation. The DPA court approval
requirement inhibits the DOJ's ability to affect personal or property
rights in a quasi-judicial manner; a corporation's fine amount, which
affects its property rights, is included in the DIA and therefore subject
to court approval.11 4 An NPA, by contrast, can require a corporation to
pay a fine without court approval." 5 Recently, the DOJ has exercised

'
The DOJ and its respective United States Attorneys' offices are responsible for
investigating violations of federal law and litigating cases where the government is an interested
party. 28 U.S.C. § 516.
0' See David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper Place: A Tool
of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 485 n.27 (2007).
1'0
See Edward L. Carter & Brad Clark, "Membership in A Particular Social Group":
InternationalJournalistsand U.S. Asylum Law, 12 COMM. L. & POL'Y 279, 279 (2007).
107
See Megan E. Haas, Tierra Sin Duehios: The Effect of Cuba's ForeignInvestment Scheme on
United States' Certified Property Claims, 15 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL'Y 93, 105 & n.96 (2009).
"os See David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1975).
109 608 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
110
See Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 658 (Tex. 2015).
II Clemens, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 823-24 (citing Shanks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 169 F.3d 988, 994
(5th Cir.1999)).
112
Shell, 464 S.W.3d at 652.
113
Shanks, 169 F.3d at 994.
114
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2000).
11

See Brooks, supra note 78, at 154 (describing common elements of DPAs and NPAs:
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more NPAs than DPAs,1 1 6 suggesting a stronger power to affect
property rights. Nonetheless, this is likely insufficient to outweigh the
DOJ's failing of the other quasi-judicial factors.
The DOJ fails the witness elements of the fifth factor as well. The
DOJ has the power to examine witnesses, both before and during a
judicial proceeding, but cannot compel their attendance. At the grand
jury and trial stage, the DOJ can obtain a subpoena from the court to
compel a witness,1 17 demonstrating that the DOJ cannot act alone.
Although Shell was "practically speaking, compelled to undertake its
internal investigation and report its findings to the DOJ," s in reality,
Shell ultimately disclosed its report voluntarily. It was in Shell's best
interest to cooperate, but Shell could have refused to meet with DOJ
prosecutors, discuss facts of the case, or provide evidence of employee
misconduct prior to the DOJ's FCPA charges.
Lastly, as even proponents of the DOJ's quasi-judicial status
concede, the sixth factor-power to enforce decisions and impose
penalties-is a judicial function reserved to the courts, not to the
prosecutors that advocate before the courts.1 19
Therefore, the DOJ fails to satisfy any of the six quasi-judicial
factors in the DPA context. Even as two factors may favor the DOJ's
quasi-judicial status in NPA negotiations, the majority weigh against
quasi-judicial status.
Vital Safeguards in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings

B.

In addition to meeting the aforementioned minimum requirements
of due process, quasi-judicial proceedings confer absolute privilege
120 A
because they possess additional safeguards to prevent abuse.
witness communicating under oath, and therefore subject to perjury
charges, is far less likely to deliberately or maliciously defame someone
"Monetary consequences in the form of a fine, restitution, and/or forfeiture of financial gains
resulting from the alleged misconduct often accompany DPAs and NPAs.").
116
Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs)
and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) 1 (2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
documents/2015-Year-End-Update-Corporate-Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-DeferredProsecution-Agreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ7W-3DAB] ("In 2015, DOJ and the SEC
cumulatively entered into an eye-popping 100 corporate NPAs and DPAs, of which 87 were NPAs
and 13 were DPAs. Of these, DOJ entered into all but one.").
117
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
s Shell, 464 S.W.3d at 658.
Ladd, supra note 14, at 976.
120
See, e.g., Siskind v. Friedberg, No. SAG-10-CV-1011, 2012 WL 1243085, at *3 (D. Md.
Apr. 10, 2012) (holding that because the defamatory statements were not made under oath,
absolute privilege is inappropriate); Cooksey v. Stewart, 938 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (La. Ct. App. 2006)
("[C]ommunications made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings carry an absolute privilege . .
offered in such proceedings so that the witness, who is bound by his oath to tell the truth, may
speak freely without fear of civil suit for damages for defamation.") (citation omitted).
u
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than an unfettered witness. Consequently, in response to arguments
over potential abuse of absolute privilege, the Shell court responded
that abuse is "limited because the speaker will generally still be subject
to the risk of criminal prosecution for perjury or obstruction of
justice." 121
However, the preliminary DOJ investigation in Shell lacked
sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse. The court did not specify
whether Shell disclosed the report under oath; given that Shell
communicated voluntarily with the DOJ prior to the filing of
information, perjury would likely be inapplicable to statements later
deemed deliberately false pertaining to Writt's performance.
Moreover, prosecuting an obstruction of justice charge is both
challenging and an unlikely safeguard. The prosecutor must prove the
statement's falsity, 122 a task that even the DOJ concedes is best
reserved for the corporation, 123 and prove that the defendant acted with
intent.1 24 The DOJ might not even have an interest in pursuing an
obstruction of justice charge because in this context, prosecution
essentially devotes taxpayer dollars to bringing a criminal case in place
of the defamation victim's civil suit. The DOJ may try to use an
obstruction of justice charge as a strategic maneuver to compel
cooperation, 125 but again this is unlikely if the DOJ is unable to prove
the statement's falsity or the defendant's intent. This safeguard's
deterrent effect also depends largely on the DOJ communicating the
threat of prosecution for obstruction before soliciting testimony.
Otherwise, corporations are equally likely to defame employees without
fear that the DOJ will hold them accountable for false statements.

Shell, 464 S.W. 3d at 655; see Pickering, supra note 94 ("If the government views
your
client as not having met this standard [of forthrightness], your client may join the long list of
would-be cooperators who instead faced prosecution for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C.,
§ 1001.").
122
18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2004) (prohibiting "[o]bstruction of proceedings before departments,
121

agencies, and committees": "Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance,
in whole or in part, with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the
Antitrust Civil Process Act, willfully withholds, misrepresents, removes from any place, conceals,

covers up, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material,
answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony, which is the subject of such demand; or
attempts to do so or solicits another to do so. . . . Shall be fined . . . imprisoned not more than 5
years or . . . both.").

"

See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.700(B)

The Value of Cooperation (2008)

("In

investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is likely to encounter several

obstacles resulting from the nature of the corporation itself. . . . Accordingly, a corporation's
cooperation may be critical in identifying potentially relevant actors and locating relevant
evidence.").
124 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
" Emil J. Bove III, InstitutionalFactors Bearing on Criminal ChargingDecisions in Complex
Regulatory Environments, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1347, 1367 (2008).
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In relying on the absolute privilege holding in Clemens, the Shell
court disregarded the significance of safeguards to the court's holding.
The Clemens court afforded the defendant absolute privilege from
agents conducting an
defamation after several government
investigation told the defendant that they would reconsider his status
126
as a witness, instead of a prosecution target, if he failed to cooperate.
Similarly, the DOJ targeted Shell in its investigation, and had Shell
not cooperated fully, the court found it likely that Shell would have
faced a substantially greater punishment. 127 However, the Clemens
court noted the presence of safeguards absent in the facts of Shell: the
lead prosecutor warned the defendant that if he lied, he could be
subject to federal prosecution. 128 The Shell court made no indication
that the DOJ had warned Shell of possible repercussions to falsely
incriminating an employee. 129 Practitioners may argue that the
potential repercussions of lying to a federal prosecutor are apparent,
and attorneys' credibility perhaps is staked on effective investigations
and honest advocacy. However, this threat of obstruction or losing
cooperation credit is not necessarily high enough in each situation to
effectively deter misconduct, especially when the payoff for naming
names is so high. 13 0 Nor is it necessarily true that an attorney
advocating before a prosecutor is a repeat player concerned with
reputational integrity. Thus, the DOJ's lack of safeguards against
abuse of defamatory privilege further demonstrates that the DOJ is not
a quasi-judicial body.
V. A BRIGHT-LINE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE RULE FOR DOJ
INVESTIGATIONS

Applying qualified privilege from defamation to all statements
made to the DOJ before a formal judicial proceeding would help
corporations navigate compliance; eliminate a perverse timing paradox
that rewards delayed cooperation; and most importantly, protect
victims of malicious defamation who are without legal recourse under
the Shell absolute privilege rule.
Simplifying Corporate Compliance

A.

Applying qualified privilege from defamation to all statements
made to the DOJ before a formal judicial proceeding would help
126
127
128
129

'0

Clemens v. McNamee, 608 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W. 3d 650, 659 (Tex. 2015).
Clemens, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
See generally Shell, 464 S.W.3d 650.
See discussion, supra Part III.B.
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corporations simplify cooperation with the DOJ. Corporate compliance
officers must sift through a patchwork of laws from different states,
courts, and regulators. 13 1 With growing regulations and DOJ
prioritization of effective compliance programs, 132 corporate compliance
costs have ballooned. 133 Thus, a bright-line privilege rule is particularly
attractive for cases like Shell where corporations must defend against
federal law violations and disparate state laws governing defamation. A
qualified privilege rule would put corporations on notice that
maliciously defamatory statements provided to the DOJ would be
subject to liability, reconciling potentially contradictory state laws. This
benefit to administrability is present regardless of whether the rule is
absolute or qualified privilege, but it is important nonetheless to note
the advantages of a bright-line rule.
Federalism, Justice Brandeis' famous celebration of states as
laboratories of democracy, 134 may be invoked to argue for state
variation in defamation law. However, this state split on defamatory
privilege is not one of careful statutory interpretation or purposeful
tailoring of law to the needs of different states. State courts,
confronting the same facts and common law governing whether a
preliminary investigation is sufficiently "quasi-judicial," weighed the
policy ramifications on both sides, and reached contradictory
conclusions. 135 Thus, from the employee perspective, a corporation's
headquarters location arbitrarily determines her ability to sue for
defamation.
Proponents of an absolute privilege rule can argue that the benefit
to administrability is outweighed by the higher litigation costs for
corporations forced to fend off a defamation action on top of potential
DOJ prosecution. 136 Without the benefit of absolute privilege, it will be
more difficult for corporations to successfully dismiss claims that allege
malice. However, this is a false dichotomy that can be addressed
through more responsible internal investigations. In reports to the
DOJ, counsel should avoid drawing conclusions when possible and
instead merely lay out the facts gathered through internal
1'
Miriam H. Baer, CorporatePolicing and Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from
Hewlett-Packard'sPretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 564 n.198 (2008).
132
Corporate Legal Compliance Handbook § 1.04 (2013), 2013 WL 6846847 (concluding that

"[t]he combination of the Caremark decision, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the revised Sentencing
Guidelines now make it more than just a good idea for a corporate board to ensure that its
company has an effective compliance program").

"' See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP.
L. 769, 770 n.3 (2014).
134
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135 See supra Part
I.
116 See Devin M. Ehrlich, Aurora Cassirer, & Scott B. Feldman,
Truth and Consequences? How
to Avoid Employee Claims of Defamation, 24 No. 8 ACC Docket 36, 38 (2006).
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investigation. 1 37 Alternatively, when in doubt, corporations should
provide both innocent and culpable explanations of an employee's
conduct.
Moreover, the DOJ should promulgate guidance documents for
conducting effective and responsible investigations. Such direction
would acknowledge the collateral litigation risks to corporations
seeking cooperation credit and help streamline best practices. For
example, corporations can adopt numerous strategies to avoid potential
defamation claims when investigating employee misconduct:
(1)
Limit disclosure of the complaint and
circumstances to those who have a "need to know."

underlying

When conducting a witness interview, explain that the
(2)
purpose of the investigation is to investigate allegations: No
determination made, no conclusions reached.
(3) Limit the persons with knowledge of the interview,
including when the interview was conducted, who conducted it,
and what was said. Not each and every supervisor or
managerial employee needs to know about the investigation and
interview.
witnesses
(4)
Remind
confidentiality.

and

interviewers

to

maintain

(5)
Make sure that those conducting the interviews or
otherwise involved in the investigation refrain from pejorative
descriptions of the complaining employee, anyone accused by the
complaining employee, and underlying circumstances.
(6)
Employers may want to create a standard form for the
documenting of witness interviews in order to ensure uniformity
with respect to the information obtained. 138
Following these guidelines cannot prevent the occasional
disgruntled employee from retaliating with a frivolous defamation
action. Nonetheless, the lower probability of liability promoted by
judicious cooperation should significantly lower a litigious employee's
incentive to sue and potential payout. Even when plaintiffs bring
meritless defamation actions under a qualified privilege regime, they

'37 Benedict P. Kuehne, Protecting the Privilege in the Corporate Setting: Conducting and
Defending Internal CorporateInvestigations, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 651, 682 (1997).
13s Ehrlich, supra note 136, at
45.
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still have to meet the high burden of proving the company's malice in
order to overcome the privilege.
The costs of implementing a qualified privilege rule are also
mitigated because corporations conducting less thorough investigations
may be the most likely proponents of an absolute privilege rule. Many
of the practices above are already part and parcel of responsible
internal investigations, aimed at protecting work-product and attorneyclient privileges.13 9 By maintaining these privileges, effective internal
investigations limit the scope of potential defamatory material accessed
by the government and other actors. This suggests that the costs
associated with defending defamation suits in an absolute privilege
regime may fall disproportionately on irresponsible or careless
corporations that conduct sloppy investigations. In addition to effective
investigative practices, if a corporation is still concerned about
defending a meritless defamation action from a disgruntled former
employee, it can agree to a more favorable severance package that
releases the corporation of any liability and prevents disclosure of
details regarding the corporation's conduct.
B.

Eliminating the Timing Paradox

Another benefit to a uniform qualified privilege rule is eliminating
the perverse timing paradox that disincentivizes self-reporting. 140 The
paradox occurs when "a proactive company that brings the violation to
the DOJ's attention only receives a qualified privilege, while a company
that waits to be discovered by the DOJ and delays cooperation receives
an absolute privilege for the same communication." 141 For example, the
Shell court concluded that Shell seriously considered possible criminal
proceedings because the DOJ had already initiated an investigation
that led Shell to conduct its own extensive internal investigation. 1 42
"[W]hen the DOJ's leverage over Shell vis-a-vis the FCPA and its
somewhat draconian potential penalties are considered, it is manifest
that Shell was, practically speaking, compelled to undertake its
internal investigation and report its findings to the DOJ." 1 4 3 This
supposed compulsion would not have existed had the DOJ not solicited
Shell to cooperate, and without the solicitation, the statements would
only be protected by qualified privilege. 144 The incentive to hold out on
12
See American College of Trial Lawyers, Recommended Practices for Companies and Their
Counsel in Conducting InternalInvestigations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 93-99 (2009).
14o See Ladd, supra note 14,
at 977-78.
141

142
143

144

Id. at 978.
Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.
2015).
Id. at 658.
See also 5-State Helicopters, Inc. v. Cox, 146 S.W.3d 254, 257
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004)
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self-reporting in hopes of absolute privilege from defamation
undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which prefer that
companies voluntarily disclose violations rather than wait for them to
be discovered. 145
Applying qualified privilege from defamation to all statements
made during a DOJ investigation would eliminate the timing problem.
With uniform defamatory privilege, some might argue that cooperation
with the DOJ could be chilled without this greater protection. Yet,
criminal prosecution presents massive financial exposure for
corporations, with rewards for cooperation far greater for those that
self-report. 146 It is unlikely that a corporation would ever hold off on
cooperation for fear of defending against a defamation action, frivolous
or not. Even without absolute privilege for preliminary investigations,
corporations' best strategy would remain early, truthful, and cautious
cooperation.
Protecting Victims of Malicious Defamation

C.

A qualified privilege rule also offers essential protections for
corporate employees. The more emphasis the DOJ places on naming
names, the stronger the corporate temptation is to scapegoat
employees. 147 The Texas Court of Appeals in Shell noted that extending
absolute privilege to such circumstances "would have the very
dangerous effect of actually discouraging parties from being truthful
with law-enforcement agencies and instead encourage them to deflect
blame to others without fear of consequence." 14 8 Recent DOJ priorities
and activism undoubtedly incentivize cooperation, 149 but courts that

(asserting that privilege only attaches to proposed and existing judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2010).
"Federal prosecutors and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 'place a high premium on self'
reporting, along with cooperation and remedial efforts, in determining the appropriate resolution
of FCPA matter."' Shell, 464 S.W.3d at 659 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice & U.S. Securities and
Exchange Comm'n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 (2012),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/469M-BBVW]); see
also Hoover, supranote 12.
147
William S. Laufer, CorporateProsecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA
L. REV. 643, 657-62 (2002) (noting the unfairness of DOJ's tradeoff of organizational cooperation
for lesser sanctions because it creates incentives for upper management to scapegoat
subordinates).
148
Writt v. Shell Oil Co., 409 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 464 S.W.3d 650 (Tex.
2015).
1'9 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.
justice.gov/opalpr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-resolveforeign-bribery [https://perma.cc/3CPM-4S56] (discussing that in connection with its settlement of
FCPA and related charges, Alstom assisted in the prosecution of its own employees).
145

711]

QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE FROM DEFAMATION

735

apply absolute privilege understate the potentially harmful effects this
strategic cooperation has on employees. The Florida Supreme Court
noted, "[t]he countervailing harm caused by the malicious destruction
of another's reputation by false accusation can have irreparable
consequences. We believe the law should provide a remedy in situations
such as this."1 50
What if Shell actually acted with malice towards its former
employee Writt? The company spent millions on an investigation with
both inside and outside counsel, suggesting a genuine interest in
discovering the truth. Similarly, most corporations strive to effectively
cooperate with the DOJ and uncover misconduct within the company.
However, given the financial incentives companies like Shell receive to
name culpable employees, a qualified privilege rule protects against the
inevitable bad corporate actor. It is difficult to know with certainty
whether the facts relayed in Shell's report were any more than an effort
to scapegoat an innocent employee. As a result of Shell's absolute
privilege, the company left Writt unemployed and without a legal
remedy. 15 1 Herein lies the difficulty in assessing the need for qualified
privilege: the actors best positioned to assess whether a statement is
deliberately false or malicious are parties to the defamation litigation,
and so it is nearly impossible to perfect the balance between frivolous
claims and genuine victims harmed by absolute privilege. Nonetheless,
courts are best suited to resolve questions of subjective intent, rather
than barring defamation actions against cooperating corporations
altogether.
Although corporations will typically prefer a rule that grants them
greater privileges, it is important to recognize that no individual
employee is immune from malicious defamation. A Shell executive
likely oversaw the company's FCPA investigation and Shell eventually
implicated Writt, a mid-level employee approving contracts abroad.
Instead, what if Shell wanted an excuse to fire an executive? The
corporate interest may favor absolute privilege, but employees at any
level of the company can be victims of defamation.
The Connecticut Supreme Court articulated the countervailing
policy for absolute privilege weighing against individual rights:
[I]n certain situations the public interest in having people speak
freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse
the
privilege
by
making
false
and
malicious
statements. ... Participants in a judicial process must be able to

15o

Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992).
Shell, 464 S.W.3d at 651.
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testify or otherwise take part without being hampered by fear of
defamation suits. 15 2
Yet, a more accurate characterization of absolute privilege's impact
than not "being hampered by fear" is one of accountability. The
administration of corporate prosecution should not automatically take
precedence over individual rights. Especially when incentives are
aligned to name names, qualified privilege presents a counterbalancing
weight ensuring the integrity of corporate cooperation with the DOJ.
VI. CONCLUSION
All statements made before a formal judicial proceeding should
enjoy only qualified privilege from defamation actions. States are far
from uniform in their determination of what constitutes a judicial
proceeding. This elicits arbitrary treatment of defamatory privilege
across states, a problem of growing significance given the DOJ's
requirement that corporations inculpate responsible employees. The
DOJ, however, is not a quasi-judicial body, as it is subject to various
restraints by the courts and possesses few of the due process and vital
safeguards necessary to preserve individual rights. Therefore, courts
should afford only qualified privilege to statements made to the DOJ
before prosecution.
A qualified privilege rule for preliminary DOJ investigations would
by
investigations
criminal
federal
facing
corporations
help
compliance
standardizing state defamation law and simplifying the
landscape. In turn, corporations would be further incentivized to selfreport misconduct earlier instead of holding out for absolute privilege
once targeted by the DOJ. Most importantly, a qualified privilege rule
would ensure that law enforcement's efforts to promote cooperation do
not ignore victims of malicious defamation by robbing them of a legal
remedy.
The Yates Memo recognized that making changes to the corporate
prosecution guidelines, like the requirement that corporations name
culpable individuals to receive cooperation credit, may present some
challenges. 153 The DOJ nevertheless believed the changes will
"maximize [its] ability to deter misconduct and to hold those who
engage in it accountable." 1 54 However, DOJ efforts to deter this
corporate misconduct disregard a different kind of misconductdefamation-invited by an absolute privilege rule. In policing

152
163
154

Hopkins v. O'Connor, 925 A.2d 1030, 1042 (Conn. 2007) (citations omitted).
See Yates Memo, supra note 12, at 7.
Id.
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corporations and prioritizing cooperation, the DOJ's enforcement
tactics can leave Writt and other similarly situated employees jobless
and stigmatized at the steps of the courthouse-doors shut. Thus,
courts should protect corporate statements to the DOJ before a judicial
proceeding with qualified privilege and ensure the proper balance
between open communication and individual rights.

